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 I very deeply appreciate this opportunity to discuss the announced 
topic with you here at the University of Kyoto today. While in Tokyo in 
March 2005 to attend the XIX World Congress of the International 
Association for the History of Religions I realized that on that occasion 
there was an entire panel devoted to Japanese research on the work of 
Hans Jonas.   And because my own interest in Jonas had grown, I 
contacted Professor Sugimura and he very kindly provided me with the 
papers presented and then later a list of the extensive recent publications 
on Jonas in Japanese. I was impressed with the amount and depth of 
research on Jonas here in Japan.  Therefore, I am especially grateful for 
this opportunity to raise a few questions with you about current views of 
Jonas, especially in America.  And, of course, I will be very grateful for 
your responses to and criticisms of what I have to say. I am also very 
grateful to have comments today from Professors Tetsuhiko Shinagawa 
and Yasunori Ando.  
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 I wish to focus a bit on what could be called Jonas-Reception in 
North America and, since I am convinced that the importance of what 
Jonas wrote about matters of bioethics is largely still unrecognized in the 
United States although that is the country where he lived from 1955 until 
his death in 1993—that is, for a large portion of his life.  My views on this 
topic have to some extent been reinforced by a long conversation I had on 
January 13 of this year with Lone Jonas, the philosopher’s widow and 
someone keenly interested in how the world views the work of her late 
husband. 
 I ask your indulgence for the fact that I feel the best way for me to 
approach this topic is by giving you a short account of my own 
acquaintance with the work of Hans Jonas.  Until a decade ago it was 
almost non-existent.  Long ago as a graduate student at the University of 
Chicago I had read Jonas’s The Gnostic Religion.  But, not being involved 
in the direct study of the Hellenistic era or the history of Christianity, I 
went no further in my studies of Jonas.  
 This changed in 1999 while I was teaching for a year in Japan and 
also reading in Japanese sources on bioethical questions. I read 
Baioeshikkusu to wa nanika by Professor Hisatake Katô and for the first 
time realized through that book that Jonas had spent much of his later 
academic life working on the philosophy of biology and on matters central 
to bioethics.  And he had even written an early critique of the notion of 
brain death as adequate for doing organ transplants from persons declared 
to be brain dead. 
  I read this at a time when these were matters of extensive public 
discussion in Japan. The opposition here in Japan to the notion of brain 
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death was, I knew, either ignored in North America or, when known, 
easily dismissed as an irrational holdover from the past, supposedly based 
on fear and religious superstition, and an anomaly in a society otherwise 
known for its embrace of technology.  On this issue Japan was portrayed 
as simply out of step with nations that are modern in their acceptance and 
use of new medical technologies. It is true, at pointed out by Professor 
Susumu Shimazono (Shimazono, 2001, 110ff) that there had been an 
unnecessary amount nationalist rhetoric in some of the early arguments 
given for Japan to resist the West in this area.  
 What surprised me, therefore, in 1999 was my discovery in reading 
the book by Professor Katô that Hans Jonas had very early articulated 
reason-based arguments against accepting brain death as death. It is there 
that I first read portions of Jonas’s essay titled “Against the Stream” 
[nagare ni kôshite] (Katô, 1986, 61ff).   Reading this released me from 
accepting the common American viewpoint that the problem of brain 
death was local to Japan. During that same year I tried to read as widely as 
possible in Japanese debates about this issue. And I saw many other 
references to Jonas and an extensive discussion of his importance for 
bioethics in a book by the late Seishi Ishii, a graduate of this university 
(Ishii, 1995)   
 I knew that Jonas had been a student of Heidegger but as a Jew he 
knew it would become impossible for him to continue to remain alive in a 
Germany rapidly becoming the Third Reich, especially after his own 
teacher became associated with that regime. His mother, he learned after 
the end of that war, had been murdered at Auschwitz. Jonas broke with 
Heidegger, joined the Jewish brigade of the British army, fought against 
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Germany, taught for a while in Palestine, and eventually went to Canada 
and from there to New York, where he was a professor of Philosophy until 
his retirement. Since you know the biographical details well I will not go 
into more detail. 
 Since in 1999 I had discovered that Jonas had important things to 
say about bioethics, I was eager to check on this with my colleagues at 
home.  But in returning to Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania 
I realized that, with few exceptions, when I mentioned the name of Jonas 
it was not recognized. Even among scholars in Jewish studies, except for 
one very senior person, the name of Jonas was unknown. In 2001 I was 
invited to give a public lecture at my university and, although I was aware 
that it might not attract many to attend it, I decided that it’s topic would be 
“Bioethics in Japan: Appreciation There of the Jewish Perspective of Hans 
Jonas.” My expectation proved right; very few people came to the lecture 
on this topic on April 10, 2001.   
 But for me it had a most welcome and happy outcome. At the end of 
the lecture an older woman greeted me and said: “I am Lone Jonas, the 
widow of Hans Jonas. I came from New York to hear your lecture and 
wish to thank you for your attention to my late husband.” Subsequently 
Mrs. Jonas moved from New York to a location not far from my own 
home and I have had the privilege of meeting and talking with her a 
number of times since then.   
 I think it was at approximately same time I met and began to have 
active professional conversations with Professor Renee Fox, the eminent 
sociologist whose collaborative studies of American organ transplantation 
practices constitute groundbreaking work and have provided some 
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disturbing accounts of this practice.   Her work, including “Spare Parts”—
translated by Naoki Morishita and others under the title “Zôki kôkan 
shakai” (Fox and Swazey, 1999) is well known in Japan. I was very 
pleased to realize that Professor Fox knew and has a deep respect for Hans 
Jonas as one of the most important, even if today largely neglected, figures 
in the field of medical ethics.  
 This had not always been the case. While a Professor of Philosophy 
at the New School in New York Jonas became a fellow at the Hastings 
Center,  founded in 1969 as one of the world’s first institutions for the 
study of bioethics. During the 1970s, a time when he was writing 
extensively on the philosophy of biology and bioethical questions, he was 
active there and recognized for his significant role. And later, after his 
death in 1993, The Hastings Center Report in 1995 had a special issue on 
“The Legacy of Hans Jonas.”  Importantly related to my topic here I can 
report that during a recent conversation with Mrs. Jonas, she stated that, to 
her knowledge, this 1995 issue of the Hasting Center Report is the only 
monograph in English on her husband focusing on him as a philosopher of 
biology and bioethicist (Interview with Lone Jonas, 13 January 2009). To 
my knowledge this is correct.  
 Jonas, I suggest, began not only to be neglected but also 
peripheralized in America during the 1990s and early 2000s. The reasons 
for this are multiple and one of them is that American bioethics, which 
provided a new field of research (and university positions) for the large 
number of philosophers trained in the analytic tradition, had little use for 
the kinds of questions deliberated to the depth they were explored by so 
- 11 - 
宗教学研究室紀要 vol.7, 2010 
obviously a “continental” philosopher as Jonas.  He himself was aware of 
this difference in the questions asked and the methods employed.   
 In addition, beginning with the 1995 Hastings Center publication 
and then even through much of the early years of the current decade the 
principal champion of Jonas in America was Leon Kass, the University of 
Chicago physician/ethicist who. appointed by former President George W. 
Bush, between 2002 and 2005 headed the President’s Council on 
Bioethics. Kass, deeply objectionable to American liberal and progressive 
bioethicists, even though himself also a Jew, appointed to that council 
many persons thought to be far too conservative—mostly opposed to 
stem-cell research and some even to legal abortion. Jonas himself, as told 
to me by his wife, was no opponent of legalized abortion and he in fact 
publicly criticized the Vatican for its stand against contraception. Yet it 
was the fact that it was Kass who was praising Jonas as the greatest 
philosophical influence on himself that apparently served as another 
reason for many bioethicists in America to simply ignore Jonas rather than 
try to differentiate his views from those expressed on the Council on 
Bioethics during the Bush Administration. It will be interesting to see if a 
re-constituted Council during the Obama administration will tilt entirely in 
the opposite direction or, unlike the one during the Bush years, include 
both what are called progressive and conservative viewpoints. If there is 
some balance, wider and more accurate attention to Jonas might return 
somehow. 
 
 Harvard’s Red Herring  
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 One possible stumbling-block to that, however, would be Jonas’s 
strong objection to accepting brain death as death. And this is because the 
supposed accuracy of this notion has long served as a sine qua non for 
cadaveric organ transplantation. Although he did not explicitly say so, I 
believe it was Jonas’s perception of how during the Third Reich some 
medical experiments on living subjects were rationalized that prompted 
his suspicion that taking the organs from persons likely to be still in some 
sense alive was morally objectionable.   
 Thus, during the 1970s, precisely when organ transplants were 
being endorsed by American religious communities—both Christian and 
Jewish—and this new practice was gaining some, even if not total, public 
acceptance, his own views were, as he himself clearly realized, “against 
the stream.”  The very title of his essay on brain death shows his 
awareness of being true to his own ethical sense even if the society would 
reject what he would say.  This fits, I suggest, with something mentioned 
to my by Mrs. Jonas. In answer a question I was raising both because of 
my own interest and because Professor Sugiyama suggested it, she said 
that what was most “Jewish” in her husband was his deep admiration for 
the ethical stances of the ancient Jewish prophets (13 Jan, 2009). This may 
be why, even at the cost of peripheralization, he dared state that brain 
death does not equal death. In 1967 and 1968 Jonas began to construct his 
arguments against the use of human subjects in medical experiments, a 
topic that naturally developed into his concern for what he saw as 
unethical in organ transplants based on the flimsy basis of brain death.  
This was precisely a time when, because the so-called “miracle of Cape 
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Town” took place on 3 December 1967, this topic was much in the public 
domain. There was talk of a regularized “harvesting” of organs.  
 During the following summer on August 5 of 1968 the so-called 
“Beecher Report” (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard 
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death) defining death 
was made public in the Journal of the American Medical Association and 
many in America’s community of physicians were prepared to accept it. 
Jonas’s objections were known and discussed by some; they were 
published in Daedalus in the spring of the following year. He had praise 
for Dr. Beecher’s personal integrity but found something ominously 
suspicious in the report’s claim that it had somehow suddenly become 
necessary to provide a “new definition of death.”  As the first part of this 
pressing need,  the Report had claimed that “improvements in resuscitative 
and supportive measures” produce an individual “whose heart continues to 
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged.” This, it was claimed, puts 
an unnecessary burden on families and on needed hospital beds.  
 Jonas saw right through this. No new definition was, in fact, needed 
to stop futile treatment in such cases. Jonas noted that even the Catholic 
Church, which he cited as “for once eminently reasonable”, recognized 
that extraordinary means to maintain life in such cases are not obligatory.  
This Harvard rationale was no more than a “red herring” put in place to 
divert attention from the fact that the true aim of the Report lay in its 
second part—namely, to define brain death as death so as to circumvent 
controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation. Jonas did not mince 
words. The new definition was designed to allow a transplantation 
physician… 
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to advance the moment of declaring [a patient] dead: Permission not 
to turn off the respirator, but, on the contrary, to keep it on and 
thereby maintain the body in a state of what would have been ‘life’ 
by the older definition (but is only a ‘simulacrum’ of life by the 
new)—so as to get his organs and tissues under the ideal conditions 
of what would previously have been ‘vivisection’ (Jonas, 1969 
[Daedalus], 243-4).  
Jonas had publicly exposed precisely the problem that had been noticed 
earlier--and privately!--by a Harvard dean when vetting a prior draft of 
Beecher’s report.  Beecher had been warned: “[This] suggests that you 
wish to redefine death in order to make viable organs more readily 
available to persons requiring transplants” (Rothman, 1991, 163).  
 In the Memoirs that he wrote late in life Jonas reports on the strong 
resistance to his resistance.  What is striking is that the “response” to 
Jonas’s critique has been no substantive response at all. That is, the way 
that America’s medical establishment and the majority of bioethicists—
both progressive and conservative—have until now responded to the 
points he was made has been by ignoring them.   
 
 Reception in Germany 
 
 Attention to Jonas in Germany, of course, has been much more 
extensive and continuous. His Das Prinzip der Verantwortung, published 
there in 1979 was an outstanding success, said to have sold 200,000 copies.  
And, as is known, in Germany Jonas became a philosophical hero of the 
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Green Party as well as for the wider movement for ecological concerns.  
And my impression is in today’s Germany, in contrast with the United 
States, having an interest in conservation of the natural resources of our 
planet can more easily be intellectually allied with a prudentialist bioethics, 
one that sees importance in being relatively conservative vis-à-vis the 
adoption of what might be radical changes to the human body via 
biotechnology. In America one finds many progressive bioethicists who 
wish to “conserve the earth” but are sanguine, even optimistic, about what 
might be accomplished through genetics.   
 The relation between Jürgen Habermas and Jonas may be 
instructive.  In his Erinnerungen, published in 2003 Jonas himself tells us 
that the members of the Frankfurt school regarded him as too conservative 
and that he was told by Habermas himself that he had blocked Jonas from 
receiving the Adorno Prize. But during a dinner at Habermas’s house he 
told Jonas that he liked the notion that the latter might receive the 
Geschwister-Scholl-Preis and said: “Ja, das paszt. Mit dem konservativen 
Geist, den Sie vertreten.” (Jonas, 2003, 326).  
 Vittorio Hösle remarks that he was invariably puzzling “to those 
readers who always ask whether an author is a rightest or a leftist, which 
in Jonas’s case, they were unable to discern” (Hösle, 2001, p. 32).  
Perhaps this was also what made things difficult for the Frankfurt school 
people.  But it is worth noting that in the works of Habermas appearing 
since the early 21st century his concern for biotechnology shows a far 
more cautious and prudentialist viewpoint than American “progressive” 
bioethicists had expected from him. And his citations of Jonas as showing 
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the way in this domain have been becoming increasingly frequent 
(Habermas, 2002, 84 ff).  
 In returning to what I call the peripheralization of Jonas within 
contemporary American bioethics, I want to call attention to something 
that may tell us a great deal. As noted, my interest in Jonas developed in 
large part after seeing him cited in Japanese publications and, once I 
recognized Jonas’s actual role in the early days of America’s bioethical 
discussions, I was astonished to see how little attention was being given 
him in American now.  
 My curiosity about this deepened. It happens that I sometimes 
engage in symposia and conversations with persons among the large 
number of Jewish-american bioethicists who are explicitly interested in 
articulating a specifically Jewish perspective in this field. In such contexts 
I have sometimes brought up the name of Jonas and queried why even 
among Jewish bioethicists so little attention is given in America to this 
person who as a Jew fought for Jews against the Nazis.  And on one such 
occasion I was told that the answer is simple: Jonas, who had studied with 
Heidegger, continued in his later writings to be a closet Heideggerean 
even though Heidegger himself had embraced the agenda of the Third 
Reich.  
 My hunch is that this impression was left in the minds of many by a 
2001 publication, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, 
Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Wolin, 2001) by Richard Wolin. This 
widely read book deals with the most illustrious among the Jewish 
students of Heidegger, persons who in varied ways reacted personally and 
philosophically to their famous teacher’s time embracing the Nazi 
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agenda…and the horrible impact of that agenda on Europe’s Jews. 
Wolin’s chapter on Jonas begins by mentioning the 1964 public lecture by 
Jonas in America when he addressed American theologians quite receptive 
to Heideggerean existentialism. To their shock Jonas exposed his former 
teacher’s public praise of Hitler and won the audience over with what he 
presented.  
 Both neither that book nor in a more recent essay (Wolin, 2008) 
does Wolin go very far in letting his readers know the depth and extent of 
Jonas’s criticisms of Heidegger. This omission allows Wolin to present 
Jonas’s philosophy as one still largely like that of his teacher. Wolin 
contrasts Jonas unfavorably to Marcuse. And his charge is that Jonas 
ultimately did not go far enough in seeing that the cultivation of truly 
autonomous individuals would be the only way to prevent society from 
falling into dictatorship—precisely the crucial flaw in Heidegger. Wolin’s 
book includes a number of scattered charges against Jonas, including 
Hobbesean views of society, Germanic Vitalism, the absence of  empirical 
data to back up his message about ecological preservation, disrespect for 
the is/ought distinction, etc.  But the fundamental charge is that Jonas 
remained enchanted with authoritarian politics and to that degree was in 
his political philosophy still a child of his Doktor-Vater. Wolin’s book 
makes no mention of Jonas’s critique of easily rationalized research on 
human subjects and how that, in fact, may have been a direct response to 
the Nazi horror. 
 It should not be difficult to see how the implication that Jonas 
remained a “closeted” Heideggerean might have been enough, at least in 
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the eyes of some, to keep Jonas somewhere off on the farthest edge of 
thinkers worthy of serious attention by bioethicists in America.   
 
 Sein/Sollen and “Progressive” Biotech 
 
 I, however, wish to push this a bit further by picking up on Wolin’s 
criticism of Jonas for going against “another time-honored precept of 
Western ethical thought: the opposition between ‘facts’ and ‘values’” 
(Wolin,  2008, 11). It is not true that “is” and “ought” are now widely 
regarded as never permitted to touch one another; recently Solomon could 
cite many social scientists showing that in bioethics these two need to be 
connected (Solomon, 2005). Philosophers too keep the debate on this 
question open.  But Wolin takes the is/ought (Sein/Sollen) distinction as 
patently non-controversial. And on this point too he casts Jonas as 
someone “following the later Heidegger, recast[ing] ethics in ontological 
terms” (2007, 11).  
 I have elsewhere (LaFleur, 2008, 461-480) analyzed Wolin on this 
point and defended Jonas’s attempt to show that what ought to be may not 
be simplistically divorced from what is. I do not wish to restate that 
argument here.  But here I suggest that assuming a simple disjunction 
between Sein and Sollen makes it easier for “progressive” bioethicists to 
cast the present state of our human bodies as unacceptable and, by contrast, 
portray positively what we may achieve through biotechnology in getting 
for ourselves or our progeny the kind of bodies that really ought to be 
brought into being. In their scenarios the distinction between what “is” and 
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what  “ought” to be is projected onto an implicit time-line, one in which 
the former takes shape as the past and the still-less-than desirable present 
whereas what ought-to-be is located in a projected future, one to which 
our biotech research will take us.   
 When such a progress-driven scenario takes on religio-mythic form 
it becomes the Jewish bio-theology of Laurie Zoloth, one in which the 
meaning of Jahweh’s decision in Genesis to “rest” tells us of God’s 
intention that, since what He had created was still less than perfect, His 
mandate to humans is to bring the human body to perfection. Even today’s 
enhancement technologies are, then, adumbrated in God’s mandate for 
circumcision because, unless that part of the male body is surgically 
“improved,” the human penis will be less than perfect, less than it “ought” 
to be. See Zoloth,  2008 and my critique (LaFleur, 2008). Although not 
carried to this extreme, some American Protestant bioethicists embrace the 
notion of humans as “co-creators” with God and, therefore, ethically 
obligated to improve the existing human body through technology. 
 Although I have enjoyed lively interchanges with Professor Zoloth 
on various occasions, I believe such a view deserves both close scrutiny 
and rejection. (The argument about circumcision, for instance, has a 
repulsive result if applied to females.)  Even though aiming to locate its 
sources within the Jewish tradition, Zoloth’s theology of divinely 
mandated perfectionism divides things very sharply into a very 
unsatisfactory world we currently have (Sein) from a world wherein we 
will be perfected and, thus, a world we ought (Sollen) to bring into 
existence.   
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 Is there a whiff of Gnosticism in this?  I suspect that Jonas might 
have detected an element of it here. About something else, however, I 
think we can be even more certain. It is that Jonas would have strongly 
warned against being captivated by such a vision of bio-perfection. One 
corollary of wanting to keep what-ought-to-be in touch with what-is 
comes out in Jonas’s warning that contemporary societies not be lured into 
ethically compromised behavior by what he called “the bait of utopia.”  In 
his view the two social forms that for a while comprised such utopian bait 
during the 20th
 But what about the 21
 century had been those of the fascism and Marxist-leninism.  
st
 Of course, Jonas, who died in 1993, did not live to see it. But his 
concerns about where technology might go in our century were deep. And 
from what he wrote we can also see that he worried about what might be 
called the bait of bio-utopianism, one most likely to thrive within a 
laissez-faire capitalism pursued in the American mode. And, given free 
rein by progressive theologies and philosophies, it might be dangling 
before us the newest bait of utopia—at least for persons most able to 
afford it. And it would be the bio and pharmaceutical industries that would 
most profit within an intellectual ethos celebrating the autonomy of choice 
and unconcerned about harm to society because of belief (never anything 
more solid than a belief!) in the workings of the “invisible hand” imagined 
by the theories of Adam Smith.   
 century?   
 
 The Missing Item 
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 Within the past 5 years even within America Jonas has been getting 
attention—but far more for how what he derived or did not derive from his 
Judaism than for the relevance of his views for bioethics. In a recent 
conversation about this Mrs. Jonas expressed her concern, because her 
husband’s views should have wide relevance, the he not be captured 
within the domain of Jewish studies. She has a decided preference for the 
description of her husband recently provided by Nirenberg 2008.  
“Wolin,” she said, “makes Hans out to be a Heideggerean and, although I 
am very grateful to Wiese, he makes my husband out to be more of a 
‘Jewish thinker’ than he really was.  Nirenberg gets it right.” 
(Conversation with L. Jonas, 13 January 2009).  
 On this point I want to return to where I began—namely first 
becoming aware through writings in Japanese that Jonas and Japan’s 
critics of the notion of brain death are in great agreement.  But, although 
today the scientific challenges to the concept of brain death are more 
substantive than ever before, a continuous refusal to notice this, precisely 
because defining brain death as real death had such a large role in modern 
progressive bioethics, is in play. In the West but especially in America 
Japan’s extensive discussions of this matter have to-date been largely 
dismissed as idiosyncratic, due to cultural peculiarities and leftover pre-
modern religious viewpoints still functioning within this otherwise 
technologically advanced society. This has been one way in which the 
American medical establishment and most American bioethicists have 
insulated themselves again the real issues raised within the Japanese 
discussions. 
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 And there must be a similar insulation then against the points raised 
by Jonas about brain death.  I suspect that this is the reason why, even 
today when Jonas as a Jewish thinker is gaining some recognition in the 
United States, within the more than 500 pages of the 2008 volume on 
Jonas recently published in English, there is only one mention of him as 
having given attention to the notion of brain death (Wiese, 2008, 437) and 
no mention at all of the fact that this was a notion, crucially important in 
the early development of bioethics, that he, in fact, found to be flawed and 
unable to support the new technology, cadaveric organ transfer, based on 
it.   
 Did Jonas, perhaps, change his mind and later in life abandon his 
view that the notion of brain death is wrong-headed?  When I recently 
asked Mrs. Jonas about that she replied that he definitely did not. And she 
then retrieved from her own library a 1994 book in German titled Wann ist 
der Mensch tot? Organverplantzung und Hirntotkriterium. The opening 
sentence of this book of essays refers to what in 1970 Jonas had written on 
this subject, the essay titled “Gegen den Strom” when published in 
German in 1985. And this book’s first item is a letter which Jonas less 
than three months before his death in 1993 wrote to the two editors of the 
new book in support of their project of keeping the public aware that this 
issue had never been satisfactorily solved.  In December of 1993 Jonas 
provided them with a copy of a letter he had written a month earlier in 
German to an old friend, Hans-Bernard Würmeling, a physician who had 
been part of the committee in the city of Erlangen at the time when the 
decision at a hospital there had been in favor of continuing “life support” 
to a pregnant woman who had, due to a tragic accident, been declared 
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brain dead. The committee’s hope was that through this technology the 
woman, though technically dead, could be assisted to deliver a live child 
many months later. This was the famous or infamous “Erlangen Fall,” 
something widely discussed and debated in the German public media at 
the time.  Jonas, as could be expected, deemed that decision to be in error 
and wrote out his opposition in detail (Hoff and In der Schmitten, 1994). 
From this it is clear that Jonas not only did not alter his position but also 
continued to think of the issue as one of ongoing ethical importance, one 
that should not be put on the intellectual and social “back shelf” and 
forgotten. 
 In my view many in contemporary society, perhaps especially in 
North American, are interested in regarding this as solved long ago and no 
longer a problem. Therefore, although there may be attention now to Jonas 
and a focused presentation of him as a Jewish “thinker,” it is regrettable 
that something so important to him as what ought to be of concern in our 
biotechnology and what he had to say about this are things that remain in 
the shadows.   
 There are hints of a change in process. The degree to which 
Habermas is citing Jonas may eventually even have an impact in America. 
A questioning of the scientific reliability of the brain death notion—by 
Shewmon, Truog, and others—may be seen as corroborating the points 
made nearly forty years ago by Jonas. A 1997 book by McKenny brings 
forward the importance of Jonas anew and a recent book by Lizza, a 
philosopher, shows the validity of his core arguments about brain death 
(Lizza, 2006).   
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 In my own view, because it was a way in which he expressed his 
deep connection to the ethical concerns in the prophetic tradition of 
ancient Judaism, Jonas’s close and critical attention to questions of 
biotechnology in our era were not ancillary but central to what being a 
contemporary Jew meant to him. In a more narrow and particularized 
sense he may not have been what some would recognize as a Jewish 
“thinker.” But—and here I think what is told us by Mrs. Jonas is very 
important—as a Jew who translates the ethical concern of the ancient 
prophets into some of the most important moral questions of our own time, 
he has universal, not particular, significance. And as I see it, this is what is 
shown by the attention to him given in Japan. 
 The future of this particular bit of biotechnology—transplants based 
on a notion of brain death—is unknown.  Its strongest proponents in Japan, 
the problematic figure of Dr. Jurô Wada for instance, insist that only by 
accepting this notion and implementing it readily for society, will Japan be 
a truly “advanced” society.  I recognize the power of such rhetoric but I do 
not think we can view what is “advanced” and what is “behind” in such a 
simplistic fashion. Perhaps at times the important criterion will be in 
locating what is morally advanced. And in this I find special relevance in 
something written by Seishi Ishii, a philosophically trained bioethicist who 
had studied Jonas closely. And, thanking you for your attention to the 
above, I wish to close with a quotation from Professor Ishii.  He wrote:  
Is the transplantation of organs from corpses morally right or 
morally wrong? In American and Europe the extraction of organs 
from the brain-dead was something that people started to do already 
quite a long time ago and many persons have been given a new 
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lease on life through it. Therefore, since Japan is usually positioned 
with America and the European countries as an “advanced” 
nation—both in terms of international perceptions and social 
consciousness—it is downright strange that transplants are not done 
here. But there is another way of looking at this whole matter of 
being “advanced.” That is, in terms of tackling the matter of how to 
exercise prudence in these things Japan can be viewed as having 
been out ahead of the others. A hundred years from now what will 
people be saying about transplants being done today? Is it not 
possible that they may come to regard it as a long rejected practice 
and a rather barbarous one at that? Maybe they will come to regard 
it as a kind of barbarian practice of the past (Ishii, 1995, 128).  
Thank you. 
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